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The Impact of Job Contact Networks on Wages of Rural-Urban 
Migrants in China: A Switching Regression Approach 
ABSTRACT 
In nationally representative household data from the 2008 Chinese Rural to Urban 
Migration Survey, nearly two thirds of rural-urban migrants found their employment 
through family members, relatives, friends or acquaintances. This paper investigates 
why the use of social network to find jobs is so prevalent among rural-urban migrants 
in China, and whether migrants face a wage penalty as a result of adopting this job 
search method. Using a switch regression approach, we find evidence of positive 
selection effects of the use of networks on wages. Users of networks tend to be older, 
to have migrated longer ago and to be less educated. In addition, married workers and 
those from villages with more out-migrant are more likely to use networks, while those 
without local residential registration status are less likely. Controlling for selectivity, 
we find a large negative impact of network use on wages. Using job contacts brings 
access to urban employment, but at the cost of markedly lower wages. 
JEL Classification: J24, J31, O15 
KEYWORDS: Social network; Job contact; Wage; Rural-urban migrant; Switching 
regression  
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1. Introduction 
There has been increased interest in the role of social networks and its relation to the 
economic outcomes. Following Coleman (1988), ‘social capital’ has been hypothesised 
as a determinant of productivity, much as human capital was earlier added to the 
conventional factors of production like land, labour and capital. Social capital has 
variously been understood as norms of behaviour such as ‘trust’ that may underpin 
economic relations or as ‘networks’ of contacts that may provide valuable economic 
gains. Early empirical studies often found large economic benefits to social capital, for 
example, for household income in rural Tanzania (Narayan and Pritchett 1999); for 
manufacturing productivity in Ghana (Barr 2000); or agricultural traders in Madagascar 
(Fafchamps and Minten 2002). The significant role of job contacts in obtaining 
employment has long been recognised, although what is less well understood are the 
possible effects on subsequent wages or labour productivity of using such networks. In 
this paper, we estimate the effect of using social networks on the wages of migrants in 
China. 
Much as the general literature on social capital focused on productivity benefits, 
theoretical models of labour markets often predict beneficial effects on wages from 
using job contacts. In line with the ‘social capital as networks’ interpretation, using job 
contacts may give job searchers more information about opportunities and ensure a 
better matching of workers to jobs, translating into higher wages for users of networks 
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(Montgomery 1991; Mortensen and Vishwanath 1994). Additionally, following the 
‘social capital as trust’ approach, those who find jobs by using contacts may feel 
additional peer pressure to perform and thus attain higher productivity and wages 
(Kandel and Lazear 1992). However, while positive wage effects from using job 
contacts are sometimes found, this is far from universal and has led to consideration 
being given as to why using job contacts may appear to lower wages (Delattre and 
Sabatier 2007). One explanation centres on training costs (Pellizzari 2010). Firms may 
only be able to expend extra effort in using formal means of filling posts (for example, 
advertising or using recruitment agencies), rather than informal means (using social 
networks). Consequently, the use of formal means of filling posts will be more common 
where the costs of the posts remaining unfilled are high, as is likely to be the case with 
posts with high training costs (and consequent high wages). A second explanation 
centres on job seeker impatience: those keen to find employment quickly may use job 
contacts, sacrificing potentially higher wages from better matched posts for quicker 
entry into work (Bentolila, Michelacci, and Suarez 2010). 
Given the ambiguous theoretical predictions about the impact of using job contacts 
on subsequent wages, it is interesting to try to estimate the impact empirically. However, 
while it is straightforward to measure the correlation between using of job contacts and 
subsequent wages, one must be cautious about drawing causal inferences from this due 
to unobservables that may affect both uses of social networks and labour market 
outcomes (Mouw 2006). Users of job contacts to find employment typically differ from 
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non-users in various observed characteristics for example, they may be often older. If 
they are found to have higher (or lower) wages than non-users, the suspicion arises that 
this may simply reflect higher (or lower) unobserved productivity. In order to control 
for the possible selectivity of use of job contacts, we employ a switching regressions 
model for wages. 
We focus on the impact of using social network on labour market outcomes for 
rural-urban migrants in China. This is an interesting case to study, not only because 
rural-urban migration in China is the largest human movement in the history of the 
world in terms of quantity, but also because rural-urban migrants in China cannot access 
institutional assistance from governments at their destinations. They are often forced to 
rely on using their social contacts to find work but the effect of this on labour market 
outcomes in China is not yet well understood. 
Our intention in this study is therefore to answer three main questions. First, what 
are the determinants of migrants using contacts finding employment? Second, is the use 
of job contacts endogenous to wages: that is to say, are the unobservables which 
influence job search methods correlated to those which determine wages? Third, what 
is the causal effect of using job contacts on subsequent wages: do users of networks 
enjoy higher or lower wages than non-users, ceteris paribus? These questions may have 
implications for policy - for example, people would question the existence of public 
employment agencies if social networks have positive impacts on job search and wages 
(Delattre and Sabatier 2007). Conversely, in the Chinese context, if using networks 
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appears to incur a wage penalty, it may spur policymakers to find ways to increase rural 
people’s access to formal means of finding urban jobs. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, 
focusing on the measures of social networks and the methods to identify their effects 
on labour market outcomes. Section 3 describes the data and the switching regressions 
model to be estimated. Section 4 reports descriptive statistics and Section 5 presents the 
econometric results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
There are a great number of studies on the relationship between social networks and 
labour market outcomes. Studies may disagree because they analyse different contexts 
or use different datasets. They may also disagree for two methodological reasons. First, 
studies use different proxies to measure social networks. Second, studies employ 
different econometric models to estimate the relation between social networks and 
labour market outcomes. Consequently, in this section, we will discuss alternative 
measures of social network and the econometric methods commonly used in the 
existing literature. 
2.1 Defining and measuring social networks 
Recent literature has largely focused on econometric methods and tended to neglect the 
issue of the measurement of social networks. Obtaining agreement on suitable 
econometric methods only but ignoring the definition of social network may lead to 
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incomparable estimates. Our intention therefore is to pay attention to the measurement 
of social networks to avoid contradictory estimates resulting from different measures 
of social network when examining the relationship between social networks and their 
labour market outcomes. 
Guanxi (social relations in Chinese) has been largely equated to social networks 
by many scholars. Zhang and Li (2003) categorise three types of guanxi for migrants: 
receiving help from relatives or family members during the process of finding a job; 
having contacts outside the dwelling region or receiving remittances transactions from 
non-family members; and having family member who are cadres. 
Some researchers use more direct measurements of social network. For example, 
Giulietti et al. (2010) measure social network by including both the quality and quantity 
of contacts. To them, the size of the social network is calculated by the total number of 
people living in cities whom they had sent greeting cards to during the last Spring 
Festival, traditionally the most celebrated holiday for rural Chinese. The quality of 
social network is proxied by a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the closest supporter 
is currently employed. Mouw (2010) uses the number of relatives in the U.S. to measure 
Hispanic workers’ social capital. Wahba and Zenou (2005) use population density as a 
proxy for the size of social network and use the unemployment rate as a proxy for the 
quality of social network. 
The most relevant measurement to this study is in Chen (2011), who reviews three 
kinds of social network: 1) the treatment effects of using contacts or social networks on 
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individual’s labour market outcomes; 2) the quantity and quality of public and social 
resources already mobilized from a given helper; 3) the quantity and quality of the 
public and social resources to which an individual has access to. This study measures 
social network adopting the first of Chen’s three definitions: relying on personal 
contacts to find jobs in the labour market. This is the most common measure of social 
networks used in labour market studies and so places us within the mainstream of work 
on this issue. 
2.2 Econometric methods for exploring the relationship between social networks and 
wages 
The most common method to explore the relationship between social network and 
wages is to run an OLS wage equation with a variable that measures social networks. 
Previous studies include Aguilera (2005); Granovetter (1973, 1983); Montgomery 
(1991); Bian (1997) and Zhang and Li (2003). For example, we can estimate a Mincer 
wage equation and include a dummy variable that equal to 1 when people use their 
social network to find a job. The coefficient of this dummy variable captures the level 
effect of social network. An assumption of this method is the restriction of the 
coefficient to being the same between users of social network and non-users of social 
network, which might be wrong in reality. 
Another problem with OLS is that there might be sample-selection bias on 
unobserved abilities in choosing job search methods. For example, migrants with high 
skills may be more likely to choose market-methods. A simultaneity bias may be raised 
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if the use of social network to find a job is correlated with the expectation of labour 
market outcomes (Giulietti, Schlutery, and Wahba 2011). Omitted variables that are 
positively correlated with both social network and earnings may lead to overestimation 
of the coefficient of networks. Therefore, endogeneity must be addressed and several 
methods have been applied to do this. 
Random assignment including social and natural experiments is the best way to 
correct self-selection bias (Mouw 2006). For example, Beaman and Magruder (2012) 
create short-term jobs in a laboratory to investigate who gets job referrals. They ask 
every participant to refer a friend who is most suitable for the job. Thus the type of 
referral contract and amount offered is randomised and selection bias is avoided. Khan 
and Lehrer (2013) try to identify the effects of changes of social networks on 
employment by using the random assignment method. 
Using panel data is another way to eliminate unobserved fixed effects (Battu, 
Seaman, and Zenou 2011; Yakubovich 2005). However, the use of panel data may 
depend on the definition of social network. For example, Knight and Yueh (2008) use 
Chinese Communist Party membership and the number of close contacts of the 
respondent as measures of social capital. They admit that panel data might fail to 
explore the effect of social capital on the labour market as CCP membership and the 
number of close contacts does not vary much over time or may even be time-invariant 
for many observations. 
A third approach to estimating the effect of networks on labour market outcomes 
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is to model the selection process and build a model of labour market outcomes that 
controls for the selectivity. Instrumental variable methods (IV), treatment effect model, 
Heckman’s Selection model, endogenous switching regression model, propensity score 
matching (Ye et al. 2012), and structural equation models (SEM) are typical methods 
to discover the selection process under restricted data. 
With IV and related econometric methods, the practical problem is finding an 
appropriate instrumental variable. Distance from home village to destination might be 
a potential instrumental variable for social networks. However, Zhang and Zhao (2013) 
prove that rural-urban migrant incomes are correlated with the distance from home 
village to destination as migrants face an income-distance trade-off. Knight and Yueh 
(2008) admit that even with the use of the best instruments available in the dataset they 
cannot deny that social network and CCP membership may be correlated with 
unobserved factors. The endogeneity still needed to be addressed. 
Both treatment effects model and Heckman selection models are two-stage 
processes. A two-step strategy involves first using a probit model on the complete data. 
They then calculate an inverse Mills ratio (non-selection hazard rate) for selected 
samples and selection hazard rate for unselected samples. The hazard rate variable is 
then used as an additional regressor in the second stage OLS model. They can be 
estimated by either the maximum likelihood method or a two stage least squares method. 
The difference between Heckman selection model and treatment effects model is that 
the former only uses the samples which are observed and does not include a dummy 
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variable in wage equation, whereas, the latter uses the full sample and includes a 
dummy variable in wage equation Guo and Fraser (2009). The Heckman selection 
model is used in Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra (2007) and Yueh (2008). 
The switching regression approach uses the Heckman two-stage procedure twice, 
one for selected sample and another for unselected sample. Studies using switching 
regressions can be found in Delattre and Sabatier (2007) and Liang (2010). Dutoit (2007) 
suggests that Hackman’s selection model should be more appropriate when one regime 
is missing, whereas, switching regression model is more appropriate when both regimes 
are observed. Specifically, the endogenous switching regression is used to address 
issues of self-selection and the estimation of treatment effects when the self-selection 
is not random and the control group is observed. 
In this paper, we use the switching regression approach as the data provides 
information of both users and non-users of social networks, and we need to address 
issues of self-selection bias in investigating the effect of social networks on wages. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on the first wave of the Rural to Urban Migration in 
China survey (RUMIC 2008). This survey was conducted in 2008 and includes 
approximately 5,000 rural-urban migrant households. Samples were randomly chosen 
in the fifteen migrant destination cities nationally. The dataset includes detailed 
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information about social-demographic characteristics, labour market outcomes, health 
conditions, major life events and social network information. Our analysis is based on 
5453 employed migrant workers, aged 16-60 years old. 
Our focus in this paper is on real wages, defined to include bonuses, allowances 
and income in-kind. Results from the survey are reported in Dmurger and Li (2012), 
Qu and Zhao (2011) and Meng, Kong, and Zhang (2010). 
Granovetter (1974) notes that individuals may use several methods to find a job 
and only one method leads to success. But the dataset we use only ask the main source 
of job finding, i.e., the one leads to retaining the job. The dataset does not have variables 
about information flows between employers, contacts, and employees, so we are limited 
in what we can analyse about the process of job search. 
3.2 Methods: Endogenous Switching Regression Model 
An endogenous switching regression is used to estimate the relation between using of 
social network and wages, controlling for self-selection bias. The endogenous 
switching regression can be used to predict expected wages for users of social networks 
if they switched to not using networks and vice versa for non-users (Dutoit 2007; 
Lokshin and Sajaia 2004; Powers 2007). This method has proved to be useful in dealing 
with endogeneity from self-selection by Adamchik and Bedi (2000) and Heitmueller 
(2006). Different decomposition methods can be used after calculating consistent 
estimates. OLS regression and treatment effects models will also be estimated to give 
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comparisons and gauge robustness. 
Let Z* denote a latent variable for the propensity to use social networks with the 
following index function: 
𝑍∗ = 𝑊𝛾 + 𝜐, 𝜐~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜐
2) 
𝑍 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍∗ > 0, 𝑍 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
where Z=1 if the individual chooses social networks to find a job and Z=0 otherwise. 
Z* can be estimated using models for binary data. 
Let Y1 be the earnings for users of social networks and let Y0 be the earnings for 
non-users of social networks. 
𝑌1 = 𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝜇1,   𝜇1~𝑁(0, 𝜎1
2) 𝑖𝑓 𝑍 = 1 
and 
𝑌0 = 𝑋0𝛽0 + 𝜇0,   𝜇0~𝑁(0, 𝜎0
2) 𝑖𝑓 𝑍 = 0 
In practice, we observe sample respondents in only one state Z = 1 or Z = 0. That 
is, we observe Y1 when Z = 1, in which case Y0 is unobserved. Similarly, we observe 
Y0 when Z = 0, in which case Y1 is unobserved. 
Assume that 𝜐, 𝜇1, 𝜇0 have a trivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero 
and covariance matrix: 
Ω = [
𝜎𝜐
2 𝜎1𝜐 𝜎0𝜐
𝜎1𝜐 𝜎1
2 ∙
𝜎0𝜐 ∙ 𝜎0
2
] 
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  where 𝜎𝜐
2 is a variance of the error term in the selection equation, normalising 
with 𝜎𝜐
2 = 1.  𝜎1
2 and 𝜎0
2 are variances of the error terms in the wage equations. 𝜎1𝜐 
is a covariance of 𝜇1 and υ, and 𝜎0𝜐 is a covariance of 𝜇0 and υ. The covariance 
between 𝜇1 and 𝜇0 is not defined, as Y1 and Y0 are never observed simultaneously. 
Using direct maximum likelihood methods, the log-likelihood function associated 
with our model is written as 
Log L = ∑ [log Φ(𝜂1) −
1
2
{log(2𝜋𝜎1𝜐) − (
𝑌 − 𝑋𝛽1
𝜎1
)
2
}]
𝑍=1
 
     + ∑ [log Φ(𝜂0) −
1
2
{log(2𝜋𝜎0𝜐) − (
𝑌 − 𝑋𝛽0
𝜎0
)
2
}]
𝑍=0
 
where 
 𝜂1 =
𝑊𝛾+(𝑌−𝑋𝛽1)𝜎1𝜐 𝜎1
2⁄
√1−𝜌1𝜐
2
  and  𝜂0 =
𝑊𝛾+(𝑌−𝑋𝛽0)𝜎0𝜐 𝜎0
2⁄
√1−𝜌0𝜐
2
 
Note:  𝜌0𝜐 =
𝜎0𝜐
2
𝜎0𝜎𝜐
=
𝜎0𝜐
𝜎0
 is the correlation coefficient between 𝜇0 and υ. 
  𝜌1𝜐 =
𝜎1𝜐
2
𝜎1𝜎𝜐
=
𝜎1𝜐
𝜎1
 is the correlation coefficient between 𝜇1 and υ. 
ϕ(∙) is the standard normal density function. 
Φ(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
After estimating the models parameters, the following unconditional expectations 
could be calculated: 
E(𝑌1|Z = 1) = 𝑋1𝛽1     (1) 
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E(𝑌0|Z = 0) = 𝑋0𝛽0     (2) 
Because of the selection problem (the failure to observe Y0 when Z = 1 and the 
failure to observe Y1 when Z = 0), we need to write these outcomes in a selection-
equation format. Taking expectations of the outcome equations, we can find the 
conditional expected earnings for a user of social networks who self-selected into user 
of social networks as follows: 
E(𝑌1|Z = 1, 𝑋1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑍
∗ > 0) 
                   = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑊𝛾 + 𝜐 > 0) 
                      = 𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝐸(𝜇1|𝜐 < 𝑊𝛾) 
                               = 𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝜎1𝜌1𝜐
ϕ(𝑊𝛾)
Φ(𝑊𝛾)
          (3) 
Where 
ϕ(𝑊𝛾)
Φ(𝑊𝛾)
  is referred to as non-selection hazard rate or the inverse Mills ratio. 
Similarly, the conditional expected earnings for a non-user of social networks who 
self-selected into non-user of social networks is: 
E(𝑌0|Z = 0, 𝑋0) = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑍
∗ < 0) 
                   = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑊𝛾 + 𝜐 < 0) 
                      = 𝑋0𝛽0 + 𝐸(𝜇0|𝜐 > 𝑊𝛾) 
                               = 𝑋0𝛽0 − 𝜎0𝜌0𝜐
ϕ(𝑊𝛾)
1−Φ(𝑊𝛾)
     (4)     Where 
ϕ(𝑊𝛾)
1−Φ(𝑊𝛾)
 is 
referred to as the selection hazard rate. 
In experimental studies, those assigned to status 1 differ only randomly from those 
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assigned to status 0, so that there is an interchangeability across statuses. However, in 
non-experimental studies one must adjust for selectivity when evaluating expected 
earnings if individuals were assigned to statuses other than the ones they in fact entered. 
The expected outcome for users of social networks if they were non-users is: 
E(𝑌1|Z = 0, 𝑋1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑍
∗ < 0) 
                   = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑊𝛾 + 𝜐 < 0) 
                      = 𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝐸(𝜇1|𝜐 > 𝑊𝛾) 
                               = 𝑋1𝛽1 − 𝜎1𝜌1𝜐
ϕ(𝑊𝛾)
1−Φ(𝑊𝛾)
     (5)  
Similarly, the expected outcome for non-users of social networks, had they been 
users, is: 
E(𝑌0|Z = 1, 𝑋0) = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑍
∗ > 0) 
                   = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑊𝛾 + 𝜐 > 0) 
                      = 𝑋0𝛽0 + 𝐸(𝜇0|𝜐 < 𝑊𝛾) 
                               = 𝑋0𝛽0 + 𝜎0𝜌0𝜐
ϕ(𝑊𝛾)
Φ(𝑊𝛾)
          (6) 
We can use Stata command movestay to estimate this endogenous switching regression 
with consistent standard errors by using the full-information maximum likelihood 
method (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). 
4. Descriptions 
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4.1 Job Search Methods 
Employed individuals in the survey were asked about the way through which they 
obtained the current (main) jobs. The survey provides an extensive list of job search 
methods as listed in Table 1. 
The job search methods in Table 1 can be grouped into four types. Group One is 
through the government, including: 1) assigned by the government, 2) through an 
employment agent run by government, 3) through a community employment service 
station; Group Two is through the market, including: 1) through a commercial 
employment agent run by private (including job fair), 2) applied for advertised job, 3) 
applied directly, 4) employer recruitment. Group Three is through social networks, 
including: 1) introduced by family members, 2) introduced by relatives, 3) introduced 
by friends, 4) introduced by acquaintances. Group four is through any other method not 
categorised 1. 
[Table 1] 
Details from Table 1 reveal that the dominant method of obtaining jobs is via 
migrants’ social network. 31.1 percent of the respondents obtained the current jobs 
through friends, the most frequent means of getting jobs. The second most common job 
search method is through relatives, which accounts for 21 percent. 7.57 percent of them 
used family members and 2.92 percent used acquaintances.  
When aggregating all sources of job search into the four main categories (in 
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Table2), we find 63% of migrants obtained their current jobs through social networks, 
followed by 32% through market mechanisms and only 2% through government means. 
[Table 2] 
To simplify the analysis but highlight on social networks, we merge those who got 
jobs by using government, market and others methods into one group to contrast the 
other group using social networks for job obtaining. This is to say, in further analysis, 
we only deal with two categories - the users of networks and others. Table 3 shows the 
details of grouping. 
[Table 3] 
4.2 Homophily 
The descriptive data in Tables 1, 2 and 3 reveal an observed tendency of homophily - 
‘like to associate with like’ in job seeking for rural-urban migrants. Contrasted with 63% 
of migrants getting jobs through social networks and 33% from market mechanism, 
only 2% utilised the government job recruitment services. The difference among the 
recruitment methods cannot be further explored by this research, as we do not have 
information on whether migrants who use social networks to get jobs also assist fellow 
migrants to find jobs. To be more specific, we have no information on the composition 
of migrants’ job contact network apart from the relationship between the job-seekers 
and the helpers; therefore we cannot pair the users and those who offer the help. With 
this, we rely on the fact that a migrant’s family members, relatives or friends are more 
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likely to share similar status. 
Homophily does matter in this research if we regard the government recruitment 
service as a public good yet find that it hardly serves rural-urban migrants, the big group 
of Chinese labour force. We further learn from Table 4 that it is the old and less educated 
are more likely to use social networks for job obtaining, and less so for the young and 
educated (Table 4). Does this reveal a restriction for them to get efficient information 
on jobs or simply a lack of market demand of them? 
Due to data limitations, we cannot detect whether the large migrant cohort has 
taken actions of such is based on economic rationality or just a series of individual 
events due to the lack of information or resources. However, we can test how their 
earnings are affected by different job-search methods. Thus, we employ a rigorous 
econometric approach to establish the relationship between the earnings and job-
obtaining methods. 
[Table 4] 
Table 4 highlights the extent to which age and education are correlated with the 
use of social networks. Older and less educated people are more likely to use social 
networks to find jobs while young and educated people tend to find jobs through the 
market, the government and other channels. This shows that the use of social networks 
is not randomly distributed across individual characteristics and thus may be 
endogenous to wages. Gender differences between the users and non-users of network 
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are small. Married people are more likely to use social network than unmarried people. 
All these variables are included in our further tests. 
4.3 Job Search Methods and Wages 
Migrants who use social networks receive lower wages than those who do not. Table 5 
reports mean hourly wages for users and non-users of social networks. The gap in 
hourly wages is 0.64 yuan or 11.7%. This suggests that there is wage cost to using social 
networks, although further analysis is required to establish a causal impact. 
[Table 5] 
We plot the logged hourly wage using the kernel density graph (Figure 1) to show 
how the distribution of earnings differs between the two types of job-seekers. We see 
that plot of the log hourly wage for the users of networks is slightly to the left of that 
for non-users, showing a gap across the distribution. 
[Figure 1] 
5. Models for Job Search Methods and Wages 
5.1 OLS regressions 
Our estimations start with OLS regressions on wage rate. The explanatory variables we 
control for are divided into personal characteristics, job related characteristics and a set 
of dummy variables for provinces. Personal characteristics include gender, age, age 
squared, years of migration, years of migration squared, and years of schooling. Job 
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related characteristics include occupation, industry, ownership sector and firm size. Our 
focus is on whether using networks to find jobs has an impact on the wages 
subsequently earned on that job. From the OLS regressions in Table 6, the magnitude 
of the coefficient is small, implying the use of social networks is associated with 1% 
lower wages, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the coefficient is not statistically significant; 
using OLS, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that network use has no effect on wages. 
[Table 6] 
5.2 Switching regression 
Since OLS estimates may be biased due to self-selection over the use of social networks, 
we run a switching regression instead. The key issue in controlling for the endogeneity 
of social networks is identification: finding instrumental variables that could be 
included in the selection model and excluded from the wage equation. Delattre and 
Sabatier (2007) use parental occupation and ease of access to public employment 
agencies to identify the effect of using social networks on wages in France 2. 
From the variables we have in the dataset, we use marriage status, ratio of migrants 
in the home village and hukou status as identifying variables. Married workers may 
have access to a wider network of contacts, via their spouses, encouraging the use of 
networks. Ye and Zhou (2010) suggest that marriage does not affect migrant earnings 
directly because most migrants are working on less skilled jobs. Where there is a large 
proportion of rural-urban migrants being sent from the worker’s home village, workers 
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in that village are likely to have more contacts who can help them find urban jobs. 
Hence we follow Chen (2009) and Chen, Jin, and Yue (2010) in using the proportion of 
labour migrants in the home village as an indicator of the village social network. When 
the household registration (hukou) of the worker is not local, they may have fewer 
contacts with local people and thus less chance of using their networks to find 
employment. We assume that these identifying variables influence the selection choice 
to use social networks but not impact wages directly (assumptions that we test 
empirically). 
The selection model from Table 7 shows that each of three hypothesised 
identifying variables have significant effects on the likelihood of using social networks 
to find employment, with the predicted signs. Amongst the other control variables, the 
use of social networks declines with education level and increases with age and with 
years of migration. Older workers are likely to have accumulated more acquaintances 
and thus have access to a wider social network. Educated workers may have less need 
to use social networks to find jobs, as their qualifications give them an edge in job 
competition. Age, age squared, years of migration, years of migration squared, and 
educational level are included in selection model. 
[Table 7] 
Table 8 shows the results of wage equations from the switching regressions. The 
rho values in Table 8, which measure the correlation coefficients between the error 
terms in the selection model and the wage equation, are both statistically significant. 
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This implies that the use of social network is endogenous to wage determination. Thus 
the switching regression is more appropriate than the OLS regression. The rho term of 
non-users of networks, corresponds to 𝜌0𝜐 discussed earlier: its positive value implies 
that unobserved factors υ which increase the likelihood of using social networks are 
positive correlated with the unobserved determinants 𝜇0 of the wages of those not 
using networks. Similarly, the positive value of the rho term for users of networks, 
corresponds to 𝜌1𝜐  and implies υ  is positively correlated with the unobserved 
determinants 𝜇1 of the wages of those using networks. 
[Table 8] 
There is thus positive selection in network use - those who use social networks are 
likely to be paid more due to unobservable factors. Note that this positive selectivity is 
present in both regimes - users of networks have unobservables that would imply higher 
wages conditional on using networks, but also conditional on not using networks. This 
implies that users of networks tend to have unobserved characteristics (‘ability’) that 
raise wages, or perhaps to work in jobs with unobserved characteristics that are 
associated with higher pay. Not controlling for this, for example in the OLS models, 
will bias upwards estimates of the impact of network usage on wages. Delattre and 
Sabatier (2007) obtained the same finding when analysing data from France in 1995. 
The switching regression model differs from an endogenous dummy variable 
model in allowing explanatory variables to impact wages differently between users of 
network and non-users of network. However, comparing the wage equations for users 
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of networks and for non-users, few differences are apparent. Generally speaking, the 
determinants of wages appear similar in the two sub-samples. Wald tests for differences 
in the individual coefficients reveal no differences in the explanatory variables that are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficients on age and age squared are each 
significantly different in the two samples at the 10% level. Plotting the joint effects of 
the age quadratics, it is apparent that wages fall with age at a faster rate for users of 
networks than for non-users. The constant terms in the two wage equations are 
significantly different from each other at the 1% level, implying wage differences 
between the two sub-samples. 
5.3 Wage difference 
Table 9 compares the predicted log wages from the wage equations in Table 7 with the 
observed values. Unconditional log wages are predicted from the switching model 
using Equation 1 and 2. Conditional log wages are predicted from the switching model 
using Equation 3, 4, 5 and 6. The predicted unconditional log wages are the most useful 
for calculating the effect of using social networks on wages, since they are not subject 
to any selectivity bias. 
[Table 9] 
Non-users of networks have somewhat higher observed mean log wages than users, 
implying a wage differential of around 9%. However, the gap in unconditional predicted 
mean wages is much greater, consistent with a wage differential of around 59%. This 
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reflects the positive selectivity of network use - network users have unobservable 
factors that raise their wages and thus the observed wage gaps masks the extent of the 
negative effect of using networks to find jobs on wages. 
It is not uncommon in the literature to find wage discounts from using social 
networks. However, what is striking about our results is the magnitude of the effect. 
For example, Delattre and Sabatier (2007) find a 7% wage discount in France in 1995. 
Bentolila, Michelacci, and Suarez (2010) report discounts of at least 2.5% in the EU 
and US. While of the same sign, the wage differentials we estimate for rural-urban 
migrants in China are of an order of magnitude higher than those found in industrialised 
countries. We can only speculate on why the wage discount from using social networks 
is so much higher in China, but one factor is likely to be the large rural-urban gap in 
labour productivity in China. Potential rural-urban migrants may be faced with a choice 
between staying in low return agriculture and finding a much more remunerative non-
agricultural job if they migrate. It is not uncommon to find estimates of labour 
productivity outside of agriculture being ten times as high as in agriculture (Knight and 
Song 2003). In such a situation, it is quite plausible that rural workers will accept a 
sizable urban wage discount from using networks, if that gives them access to urban 
jobs. 
5.4 Robustness tests 
OID test 
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In our selection model, we use three instrument variables: marriage status, ratio of 
labour migrants in home village and hukou status. We assume that the instrumental 
variables only affect wages through network use. We test this assumption by an over-
identifying test for instrumental variables in Table 10. The dependent variable is the 
residual of wage equation from the switching regressions. The independent variables 
are all the exogenous regressors in the wage equations together with the three 
instrumental variables. This auxiliary regression shows that all the instrumental 
variables do not affect the residuals of the wage equations, so we cannot reject our 
assumption that they can be excluded from the wage equations. 
[Table 10] 
In preliminary work, we explored various other potential instruments for network 
usage, including family political background, parental education, parental occupation, 
number of siblings, number of friends living in urban areas and the distance from home 
province to working province. However, these were rejected as instruments either 
because they were not correlated with network user or because they were correlated 
with wage residuals from the switching regressions. Specifically, although family 
political background is a good IV in Zhang and Lu (2009), it is not correlated with the 
use of networks in our data. Likewise, parents’ education and occupation are not 
significantly correlated with the use of network. The number of siblings, the number of 
friends living in city and the distance from the home province to the workplace province 
are correlated with the use of network, but fail the OID test. 
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Treatment effects models 
An alternative to the switching regressions approach is to use a treatment effects model, 
in which use of social networks in job search is included as an endogenous dummy 
variable in a wage equation. Both Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Two Step estimators 
imply the dummy variable has large, significant negative impacts on wages. The 
coefficient implies use of networks would lower log wages by 0.438 points. This is of 
a similar order of magnitude to that implied by a comparison of the predicted 
unconditional mean log wages from the switching regression models. 
[Table 11] 
6. Conclusion 
It is well understood that social networks play an important role in labour markets, with 
many people finding jobs through their friends, acquaintances and relatives. In our 
survey of rural-urban migrants in China in 2008, nearly two thirds found their 
employment by such job contacts. However, what is less clear is the impact of such job 
search mechanisms on subsequent wages. Addressing this issue in a convincing manner 
requires explicit consideration of the selection process which determines whether or not 
workers use social networks to find their jobs and whether this causes any selectivity 
bias for wages. 
In this paper, we modelled the selection of job search methods. We found that users 
of networks to find jobs tended to be older, to have been migrants for longer and to be 
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less educated. In addition, married workers and those from villages which sent out many 
migrants were more likely to use networks, while those with non-local household 
registration were less likely. The last three effects - marital status, migration rates in 
home village and household registration – were used as instrumental variables to 
identify the impact of network use on wages. 
We found evidence of positive selection effects between use of networks and 
wages. Those using networks to find their jobs appear to have unobservables that are 
associated with higher pay - this could be unobserved personal characteristics such as 
ability or perhaps remunerative job characteristics. Thus, although users of networks 
are less educated than non-users, they appear to have other, unobserved advantages for 
pay determination. This implies that simple estimations of the impact of network use 
on migration that do not control for selectivity are upwards biased - benefits would be 
ascribed to networks that more properly reflect the favourable unobserved 
characteristics of network users. 
Controlling for selectivity, we find a large negative impact of network use on 
wages. Using job contacts brings benefits in terms of giving people from rural China 
access to urban employment. However, it also imposes a substantial cost - those urban 
jobs found using job contacts pay markedly less than those found by impersonal means. 
This negative effect of using employment has been found before, using comparable 
methods, in industrialised countries. However, what is striking about our results is the 
magnitude of the effect. This may be explicable given the greater segmentation of 
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labour in China and the consequent large gap in labour productivity between agriculture 
and the employment of rural-urban migrants. At first look it appears a puzzle, why so 
many rural-urban migrants use friends and relatives to find jobs if they face a wage 
penalty as a result. However, such migrants may have less chance of finding jobs if they 
rely on formal means of job search. Given the large gap in labour productivity rural and 
urban areas, it may well be worth accepting a wage discount by using social networks 
if it is the means by which the migrants can escape low return farming and find more 
remunerative work in urban areas. 
Before drawing strong policy conclusions, further research is required into the 
possible barriers facing migrants in accessing market or state mechanisms for urban job 
search. However, our paper does provide prima facie evidence of imperfections in the 
labour market: many migrant workers appear unable to use such formal mechanisms, 
so the majority rely on social networks – apparently at the cost of obtaining 
substantially lower paying jobs. This finding does not reflect a selectivity bias – indeed, 
correcting for such bias dramatically increases the estimated wage cost of using 
networks to find employment. Our research suggest that efforts to publicise information 
about urban job vacancies in rural areas, whether through expanding existing state job 
exchanges or promoting private alternatives, could bring large benefits for migrant 
workers. Not only would such efforts increase access to urban employment for migrants, 
they may also raise the wages paid if they do find urban jobs. Social capital may be 
substituting for the lack of well-functioning formal labour market institutions, but it is 
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far from a perfect substitute. 
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Notes 
1. Granovetter (1974) divides job search methods into three groups: formal means, 
personal contracts, and direction application. He argues direction application that does 
not use a formal or personal intermediary is different from both formal means and from 
personal contacts. 
2. Liang (2010) use a switching regression model to estimate the effect on wages of using 
social networks to find jobs in eight cities in China. Their exclusion restriction is to use 
the square of the age at which workers obtained their jobs in the selection model but not 
in the wage equations. This exclusion restriction seems a questionable a priori given that 
they include the linear term for age at which workers obtain their jobs in both the 
selection and wage equations. 
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Table 1: Composition of job search methods 
Job search methods Frequency  Percent 
Assigned by the government 30 0.55 
Through employment agent run by government 52 0.95 
Through community employment service station 37 0.68 
Through commercial Employment agent run by private 316 5.79 
Applied for advertised job 395 7.24 
Applied directly 613 11.24 
Introduced by family members 413 7.57 
Introduced by relatives 1145 21 
Introduced by friends 1696 31.1 
Introduced by acquaintance 159 2.92 
Employer recruitment 447 8.2 
Other (please specify) 150 2.75 
Total 5453 100 
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Table 2: Regrouped composition of job search methods 
Job search methods Frequency  Percent 
Through the government 119 2.18 
Through the market 1771 32.48 
Through social network 3413 62.59 
Other  150 2.75 
Total 5453 100 
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Table 3: Users of network and non-users of network 
Job search methods Frequency  Percent 
Users of network  3413 62.59 
Non-users of network   2040 37.41 
Total 5453 100 
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Table 4: Users of network and non-users of network  
Non-users of network   Users of network Total 
Female 42.25 42.43 42.36 
Male 57.75 57.57 57.64     
Married 52.99 60.01 57.38 
Unmarried 47.01 39.99 42.62     
Age 16-25 45.54 40.2 42.20 
Age 26-35 28.53 28.77 28.68 
Age 36-45 20.05 22.21 21.40 
Age 46 and above 5.88 8.82 7.72     
Elementary school or blew 10.10 14.70 12.98 
Junior middle school 48.77 58.16 54.64 
Senior middle school 20.83 16.87 18.36 
Specialized secondary or above 20.29 10.27 14.02 
  
 41 
 
Table 5: Users of network and non-users of network  
N Hourly wage log hourly wage   
Mean SD Mean SD 
Users of network 2030 6.02 3.96 1.73 0.54 
Non-users of network  3389 5.39 3.39 1.63 0.50 
Total 5419 5.63 3.62 1.67 0.52 
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Table 6: Wage equations: OLS regressions 
 All Sample Non-users of network Users of network 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Users of network -0.0091 0.0135     
Age 0.0417*** 0.0047 0.0294*** 0.0085 0.0477*** 0.0057 
Age squared -0.0647*** 0.0068 -0.0481*** 0.0124 -0.0729*** 0.0081 
Years of migration 0.0218*** 0.0035 0.0316*** 0.0055 0.0174*** 0.0042 
Years of migration 
squared 
-0.0478*** 0.0126 -0.0823*** 0.0181 -0.0322** 0.0153 
Male 0.1096*** 0.0130 0.0841*** 0.0223 0.1283*** 0.0160 
Years of schooling 0.0424*** 0.0027 0.0500*** 0.0048 0.0372*** 0.0034 
Occupation: Base group=White collar 
Blue collar -0.1953*** 0.0247 -0.2360*** 0.0360 -0.1470*** 0.0342 
Other occupation -0.1643 0.1012 -0.0748 0.1460 -0.1961 0.1330 
Industry: Base group=Manufactory 
Construction 0.1204*** 0.0240 0.1506*** 0.0465 0.1141*** 0.0281 
Electricity, gas, 
water, IT and 
transportation 
0.0217 0.0331 -0.0073 0.0544 0.0476 0.0418 
Commerce and 
trade 
0.0091 0.0228 0.0191 0.0413 0.0112 0.0271 
Restaurant and 
catering 
-0.1232*** 0.0210 -0.1361*** 0.0340 -0.1046*** 0.0266 
Finance, estate, 
health, education 
-0.0374 0.0236 -0.0158 0.0395 -0.0421 0.0293 
Services -0.0626** 0.0266 -0.0636 0.0445 -0.0490 0.0331 
Ownership: Base group=State and collective 
Private enterprises -0.0477** 0.0223 -0.0724* 0.0410 -0.0367 0.0263 
Self-employed 
Individuals 
-0.0790*** 0.0256 -0.0807* 0.0468 -0.0848*** 0.0303 
Foreign, joint 
venture 
0.0368 0.0277 0.0240 0.0477 0.0328 0.0345 
Shared company 0.0340 0.0283 0.0565 0.0495 0.0006 0.0342 
Other enterprise -0.2063 0.1403 -0.4682*** 0.1528 0.1451 0.1379 
Firm size: Base group= Below 8 
8-50 0.0921*** 0.0192 0.0870** 0.0341 0.0925*** 0.0234 
Above 50 0.1347*** 0.0200 0.1619*** 0.0354 0.1216*** 0.0241 
Constant 0.7124*** 0.0870 0.7912*** 0.1478 0.6458*** 0.1065 
Adjust R2 0.3330  0.3384  0.3283  
N 4845  1819  3026  
Notes: Dependent variable=log of hourly wage; SE refers to robust standard error; Provinces 
controlled. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Switching regression: selection model  
Coefficient SE 
Unmarried -0.1572*** 0.0524 
Non-local rural hukou -0.1193*** 0.0436 
Ratio of labour migrants in home village 0.0044*** 0.0008 
Age -0.0382** 0.0158 
Age squared 0.0528** 0.0218 
Years of migration -0.0139 0.0113 
Years of migration squared 0.0848** 0.0426 
Male 0.0288 0.0395 
Education: base group=Junior middle school 
Elementary school or blow 0.1265** 0.0593 
Senior middle school -0.1854*** 0.0443 
Specialized secondary school -0.4888*** 0.0519 
Constant 0.9628*** 0.2633 
N 4723 
 
Note: Dependent variable: dummy=1 if user of network. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Switching regression: wage equation  
Non-users of network Users of network  
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Age 0.0255*** 0.0091 0.0463*** 0.0059 
Age squared -0.0412*** 0.0133 -0.0700*** 0.0084 
Years of migration 0.0284*** 0.007 0.0150*** 0.0045 
Years of migration squared -0.0615** 0.0269 -0.0174 0.0161 
Male 0.0923*** 0.0244 0.1278*** 0.0176 
Years of schooling 0.0346*** 0.0052 0.0288*** 0.0036 
Occupation: Base group=White collar 
   
Blue collar -0.2137*** 0.0345 -0.1376*** 0.0315 
Other occupation -0.0708 0.1655 -0.1754 0.1231 
Industry: Base group=Manufactory 
   
Construction 0.1572*** 0.0425 0.1066*** 0.0281 
Electricity, gas, water,  IT and 
transportation  
-0.0054 0.0572 0.0506 0.0414 
Commerce and trade 0.0254 0.0383 0.0076 0.028 
Restaurant and catering -0.1379*** 0.0348 -0.1109*** 0.0268 
Finance, estate, health, education -0.025 0.0378 -0.0437 0.0295 
Services -0.0599 0.0393 -0.0588* 0.0310 
Ownership: Base group=State and collective 
  
Private enterprises -0.0501 0.0399 -0.0411 0.0261 
Self-employed Individuals -0.0595 0.0454 -0.0902*** 0.0297 
Foreign, joint venture 0.0411 0.0454 0.0248 0.0349 
Shared company 0.0721 0.0475 0.0024 0.035 
Other enterprise -0.4367** 0.1797 0.104 0.2394 
Firm size: Base group= Below 8 
   
8-50 0.0846*** 0.0321 0.0987*** 0.0223 
Above 50 0.1512*** 0.0325 0.1235*** 0.0235 
Constant 1.2765*** 0.1733 0.5617*** 0.1073 
Rho 0.6613*** 0.0662 0.6227*** 0.0647 
Sigma 0.5107 0.0239 0.4604 0.0144 
R2 0.3614 
 
0.3366 
 
N 1765 
 
2958 
 
Note: Dependent variable=log of hourly wage; Provinces controlled.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9: Observed and predicted log hourly wages   
Mean SD 
Users of network Observed 1.6285 0.5015  
Unconditional 1.4608 0.2784  
Conditional on users of network 1.6286 0.2897  
Conditional on non-users of network 2.1705 0.3014 
Non-users of network Observed 1.7181 0.5317  
Unconditional 2.0490 0.2971  
Conditional on users of network 1.2349 0.2915  
Conditional on non-users of network 1.7176 0.3166 
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Table 10: Over-identifying test  
Coefficient SE 
Unmarried -0.0103 0.0200 
Non-local rural hukou -0.0066 0.0184 
Ratio of labour migrants in home village -0.0004 0.0003 
Constant 0.0237 0.0267 
Adjust R2 -0.0062 
 
N 4723 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: residual of wage equation from switching 
regression. All variables used in wage equation are controlled.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11: Wage equations from Treatment eﬀ ect models: ML and two-steps  
ML Two-steps  
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Users of network -0.4380*** 0.0558 -0.5303*** 0.1131 
Rho 0.5705***  0.6631***  
Sigma 0.4662 
 
0.4871 
 
Lambda 0.2660 
 
0.3230 
 
N 4723 
 
4723 
 
Note: Dependent variable=log of hourly wage. Personal characteristics, job characteristics and 
Province dummies controlled. *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1: Kernel density graph of log of hourly wage 
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Appendices 
Table A.1: Data descriptions (mean or frequencies)  
Non-users of network Users of network Total 
Age 29.16 30.6 30.06 
Years of migration 7.73 8.34 8.11 
Years of schooling 9.46 8.68 8.97 
Ratio of labour migrants in 
home village 
56.46 59.38 58.28 
Female 42.25 42.43 42.36 
Male 57.75 57.57 57.64 
Married 52.99 60.01 57.38 
Unmarried 47.01 39.99 42.62 
Local rural hukou 16.72 20.77 19.26 
Non-local rural hukou 83.28 79.23 80.74 
Occupation 
  
White collar 10.87 6.25 7.98 
Blue collar 83.82 89.11 87.13 
Other occupation 5.31 4.64 4.89 
Industry 
   
Manufactory 26.71 20.95 23.1 
Construction 8.44 14.41 12.18 
Electricity, gas, water,  IT and 
transportation 
3.58 4.2 3.97 
Commerce and trade 17.18 19.31 18.51 
Restaurant and catering 20.23 19.04 19.49 
Finance, estate,health, education 12.86 11.53 12.03 
Services 11.00 10.56 10.73 
Ownership 
  
State and collective 8.38 10.17 9.50 
Private enterprises 40.65 43.61 42.5 
Self-employed Individuals 24.39 28.73 27.1 
Foreign, joint venture 15.31 9.15 11.46 
Shared company 10.97 8.22 9.25 
Other enterprise 0.30 0.12 0.19 
Firm size 
   
Below 8 23.93 27.31 26.05 
8-50 25.11 30.16 28.27 
Above 50 50.96 42.53 45.6 
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Table A.2: Wage equations from Treatment eﬀect models: ML and two-steps  
ML Two-steps  
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Users of network -0.4380*** 0.0558 -0.5303*** 0.1131 
Age 0.0403*** 0.0051 0.0401*** 0.0054 
Age squared -0.0619*** 0.0074 -0.0615*** 0.0077 
Years of migration 0.0185*** 0.0039 0.0183*** 0.0041 
Years of migration squared -0.0291** 0.0143 -0.0271* 0.0150 
Male 0.1113*** 0.0147 0.1118*** 0.0153 
Years of schooling 0.0328*** 0.0031 0.0303*** 0.0039 
Occupation: Base group=White collar 
 
Blue collar -0.1781*** 0.0230 -0.1759*** 0.0231 
Other occupation -0.1389 0.0985 -0.1389 0.0991 
Industry: Base group=Manufactory 
 
Construction 0.1156*** 0.0233 0.1131*** 0.0234 
Electricity, gas, water, 
transportation and IT 
0.0250 0.0337 0.0250 0.0337 
Commerce and trade 0.0082 0.0227 0.0065 0.0227 
Restaurant and catering -0.1281*** 0.0213 -0.1281*** 0.0213 
Finance, estate, health, education -0.0438* 0.0232 -0.0467** 0.0232 
Services -0.0665*** 0.0243 -0.0657*** 0.0242 
Ownership: Base group=State and collective 
Private enterprises -0.0450** 0.0221 -0.0456** 0.0221 
Self-employed Individuals -0.0770*** 0.0251 -0.0762*** 0.0251 
Foreign, joint venture 0.0376 0.0274 0.0357 0.0274 
Shared company 0.0367 0.0280 0.0342 0.0281 
Other enterprise -0.2643* 0.143 -0.2612* 0.1402 
Firm size: Base group= Below 8 
  
8-50 0.0957*** 0.0184 0.0951*** 0.0184 
Above 50 0.1330*** 0.0191 0.1316*** 0.0192 
Constant 1.0695*** 0.1014 1.1502*** 0.1333 
Rho 0.5705 
 
0.6631 
 
Sigma 0.4662 
 
0.4871 
 
R2 0.2660 
 
0.3230 
 
N 4723 
 
4723 
 
Note: Dependent variable=log of hourly wage; Provinces controlled. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
